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NOTES
GERRYMANDERED GRIDLOCK:
ADDRESSING THE HAZARDOUS IMPACT
OF PARTISAN REDISTRICTING
NATHAN S. CATANESE*
“It used to be that the idea was, once every two years voters elected their
representatives, and now, instead, it’s every ten years the representatives
choose their constituents.”1
“We are in the business of rigging elections.”2
“To sum up, redistricting is a political disaster—an enormous political train
wreck that occurs every ten years.”3
INTRODUCTION
Nate Silver, noted statistician and founder of the popular blog Five
Thirty Eight, recently estimated that in the House of Representatives, out
of the four hundred and thirty-five districts, there are only thirty-five
swing districts.4  Essentially, this means that congressional districts have
become more polarized—either Republican-leaning districts are more
conservative or Democratic-leaning districts are more liberal.5  With
more members elected from districts in which there is no threat from
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2014; B.A., University of Notre Dame,
2007.  I would like to thank my advisor, Professor John Copeland Nagle, for his helpful
feedback.  I would also like to thank my wife, Kristen; my parents, Lisa & Sam; my brother
Jason; and my entire family for their love, support, and comments on earlier drafts.
Finally, I would like to thank the editors and members of the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy for their hard work on this Note.
1. Jeffrey Toobin, Drawing the Line:  Will Tom DeLay’s Redistricting in Texas Cost Him
His Seat?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 6, 2006, at 35 (quoting Stanford Law School Professor
Pamela Karlan).
2. John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, WINSTON-SALEM J.,
Jan. 27, 1998, at B1 (quoting former North Carolina State Senator Mark McDaniel).
3. DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES:  HOW PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA-
TION ELECTIONS COULD REVITALIZE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 59 (2d ed. 2002).
4. Nate Silver, As Swing Districts Dwindle, Can a Divided House Stand?, FIVE THIRTY
EIGHT (Dec. 27, 2012, 9:46 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/
as-swing-districts-dwindle-can-a-divided-house-stand/.  To contrast today’s numbers with
recent history, he said that in 1992 there were as many as 103 swing districts. Id.
5. The 112th Congress was the most polarized Congress since Reconstruction. See
Ezra Klein, 14 Reasons Why This is the Worst Congress Ever, WONKBLOG (July 13, 2012, 8:00
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons-
why-this-is-the-worst-congress-ever/.
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an opposing party, there is less incentive for members of Congress to
moderate or to make bipartisan deals.  This is because the only likeli-
hood of their losing an election is from losing to a more ideologically
extreme candidate in a primary election.6  Ultimately, this polarization
leads to less policy-making and more gridlock in Washington.
This shift has been costly to the United States.  In 2011, citing
gridlock in Congress, Standard & Poor’s downgraded the United
States’s debt rating to AA+ for the first time in history.7  Gridlock not
only increases the likelihood that the federal government will default
on its debt obligations, but is also bad for public policy in general.  Sim-
ilarly, gridlock was one of causes that led Congress to shut down the
federal government in the fall of 2013.8  With such detrimental impact
on the United States, understanding the cause of this problem and tak-
ing appropriate action to remedy it are of paramount importance.
This Note argues that partisan redistricting, also known as gerry-
mandering, is a major cause of America’s gridlock in Congress because
it increases the number of representatives elected from polarized con-
gressional districts.  Rather than simply trying to draw districts along
pre-existing county or municipal boundaries, state lawmakers have tried
to achieve hyperpartisan gain through the redistricting process.  In so
doing, they have created fewer competitive districts.  This arrangement
favors electing ideologically extreme candidates that have little to no
interest in making political compromises, especially since it increases
the likelihood of a primary election challenger.9
Specifically, in Part I, this Note examines the history of gerryman-
dering in the United States: how various requirements for redistrict-
ing—both from Congress and from the Supreme Court—were imposed
on the states and the effects that historical Supreme Court cases have
had on redistricting.  Part I also looks at the state of gerrymandering
today by examining its effects in the 2012 congressional elections and
exploring some of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on state
redistricting laws.  Specifically, this Note looks at how the Supreme
Court has been vague about what would comprise an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander, even in the face of some outrageous examples,
thus permitting the status quo.
In Part II, I argue that because the Supreme Court and Congress
have failed to act on gerrymandering, either the state legislatures or
6. See Silver, supra note 4.  “Most members of the House now come from hyperpar-
tisan districts where they face essentially no threat of losing their seat to the other party.
Instead, primary challenges, especially for Republicans, may be the more serious risk.” Id.
7. Binyamin Appelbaum & Eric Dash, S & P Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S. for the
First Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at A1.
8. See e.g., J.P.P., Sorry we’re closed, Democracy in America, ECONOMIST (Oct. 1, 2013,
5:30), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/10/americas-gov-
ernment-shutdown.
9. See Steve Coll, Building a Better Democracy, DAILY COMMENT (Jan. 10, 2013), http://
www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/01/ending-gerrymandering-and-
building-a-better-democracy.html (“[B]ecause many . . . run in super-safe conservative
districts, Republican congressional candidates often fear radical-right primary challengers
more than the Democrats they will face in the general election.”).
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Congress need to provide guidance in order to create a better redistrict-
ing system.
In Part III, this Note looks at some of the practical consequences of
gerrymandering, and also examines the impact that it has on partici-
pants in the political system and on public policy.
Part IV discusses how various states have dealt with partisan gerry-
mandering and what they have done to prevent it.  It also looks at the
relative success of the various legislative initiatives in those states.  Part
IV also briefly looks at how the United Kingdom and Canada have dealt
with and prevented partisan redistricting.
Finally, in Part V, I recommend what can be done to alleviate the
gridlock and to help the United States moving forward: state legisla-
tures and Congress need to pass legislation mandating the creation of
independent commissions to redraw districts.  However, Congress is not
likely to act until more states pass their own legislation.  But if more
states pass redistricting reform laws, it will help to fix the problems the
United States currently faces because of gerrymandering.
I. BACKGROUND
When the Founding Fathers drafted the Constitution, they decided
that the states would have equal representation in the Senate and pro-
portional representation in the House of Representatives.10  Specifi-
cally, the Constitution states that members of the House of
Representatives “shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”11 Because of this provision,
the government needed to accurately ensure that each state was allo-
cated the correct number of representatives.  Thus, the Constitution
also mandates that a census be held every ten years, stating that an
“actual Enumeration shall be made . . . within every subsequent Term
of ten Years, in such manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct.”12  The
United States Census Bureau, a division of the U.S. Department of
Commerce, conducts modern censuses.13
But the determination of how many representatives each state
receives is not the only purpose of the census—each state must also
draw districts of equal population to ensure that all of its citizens have
an equal voice in Congress.  “In addition to determining the apportion-
ment of Representatives among the states, decennial population census
data fulfills several purposes [including] provid[ing] state and local
governments a basis for establishing district boundaries for congres-
sional, state legislative, and local representative bodies . . . .”14
10. See July 16, 1787: A Great Compromise, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/minute/A_Great_Compromise.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
13. See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
14. MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42483, LEGAL ISSUES REGARD-
ING CENSUS DATA FOR REAPPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING 1 (2012).
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A. Policy Matter for the States
Generally, states have the authority and prerogative to draw dis-
tricts how they see fit.  “For the nation’s first fifty years, federal
lawmakers ignored redistricting entirely: as long as a state elected no
more than its allotted number of representatives, its legislature could
draw district boundaries any way it wanted.”15  However, in 1842 Con-
gress limited the drawing of districts so that they were single-member
and contiguous.16  In 1872, Congress added a third criterion—that the
districts must have “as near as practicable, an equal number of inhabi-
tants.”17  Thus, “[e]ven states not adding or losing congressional repre-
sentatives need new district maps that reflect the population shifts
within their borders, so that residents are equally represented no mat-
ter where they live.”18  The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in
Wesberry v. Sanders,19 when it said, “[w]hile it may not be possible to
draw congressional districts with mathematical precision, that is no
excuse for ignoring our Constitution’s plain objective of making equal
representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for
the House of Representatives.”20  The case also applied the “one person
one vote” standard to redistricting.21
In 1929, Congress established a permanent number of representa-
tives in the House—435—and set forth a means to reapportion the
number of representatives among the states after each decadal
census.22
Other than the criteria that have been established by Congress,
along with other criteria set forth by the courts, the states are essentially
able to determine on their own how to redraw the congressional dis-
tricts within their borders.23  Some state legislatures, like California’s,
have delegated the duty to redraw congressional districts to a non-gov-
ernment or “citizens” panel.24  Other states, like Pennsylvania, pass
their new congressional district maps as normal legislation needing
bicameral and gubernatorial approval.25  Each state still has the author-
ity to change the way in which it redraws its congressional map.  In the-
ory, they could do away with partisan gerrymandering through
15. MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES: HOW POLITICIANS MANIPU-
LATE ELECTRONIC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS 20 (2001).
16. Id.
17. An Act for the Apportionment of Representatives to Congress Among the Sev-
eral States According to the Ninth Census, ch. 11, 17 Stat. 28, 28 (1872).
18. Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Sep. 19, 2012,
8:56 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/
309084/.
19. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
20. Id. at 18.
21. Id.
22. The Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21 (1929) (codified at 2
U.S.C. § 2a).
23. Of course, it is worth noting that as of the last census in 2010, six states were
only allocated one representative, thus nullifying the need for redistricting.
24. See infra Part V.A, California.
25. Congressional Redistricting, PA. REDISTRICTING, http://www.redistricting.state.pa.
us/Congressional-Redistricting.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
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legislation (as some states have done).26  Alternatively, they could con-
tinue to allow partisan gain through the political process.27
B. Redistricting for Partisan Gain
In 1812, the Massachusetts legislature redrew its legislative bounda-
ries following the 1810 census.  The state’s Democratic-Republicans
were the majority party and drew a new map to increase their ranks
over the state’s dwindling Federalists.  They did this by “packing Feder-
alist voters into a few strongholds while carving out a long, thin Repub-
lican district along the northern, western, and southwestern edges of
Essex County.”28  Ultimately, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry
signed the new plan into law, even though he disliked it.29  Newspapers
sympathetic to the Federalist Party were quick to mock the plan in a
political cartoon, dubbing the new district a “Gerrymander.”30  The
term for redrawing political districts for partisan gain has been around
ever since.
26. See infra Part V.A, California.
27. See infra Part V.C, Florida.
28. MONMONIER, supra note 15, at 1.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2.  Even though today’s term gerrymandering is used with a soft “j” sound,
Gerry’s last name was pronounced with a hard “g.” Id.
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THE GERRYMANDER POLITICAL CARTOON31
Today’s gerrymandering has been called “the most insidious prac-
tice in American politics—a way, as the opportunistic machinations fol-
lowing the 2010 census make evident, for our elected leaders to
entrench themselves in 435 impregnable garrisons from which they can
maintain political power while avoiding demographic realities.”32
After examining the congressional elections held in November
2012, it is obvious that gerrymandering helped the Republican Party
retain control of the House of Representatives.33  The Republicans won
31. Elkanah Tisdale, The Gerry-Mander, BOSTON GAZETTE, Mar. 26, 1812, at 2.
32. Draper, supra note 18. But see Franita Tolson, Benign Partisanship, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 395, 398 (2012) (arguing that partisan gerrymandering is actually positive
for governance, because it safeguards federalism). See also Richardson Dilworth, American
Cities as Firms in the 21st Century—Or, Should Philadelphia Move to New Jersey?, 24 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 99 (2010) (suggesting that states should be able to redis-
trict major cities into or out of their borders, albeit for urban development policy
reasons).
33. In fact, the redistricting following the 2010 census may help Republicans for the
next decade. See Alex Isenstadt, The Democrats’ Lost Decade?, POLITICO (June 19, 2013, 5:05
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a majority of seats in the House of Representatives, winning 233 seats to
the Democrats’ 192.34  However, Americans, as a whole, cast more votes
for Democratic candidates than Republicans—as of counts on Novem-
ber 8, 2012, 53,952,240 votes were cast for Democratic candidates while
only 53,402,643 votes were cast for Republican candidates.35  Thus, it
can be mathematically deduced that the Democrats elected to Congress
won by larger majorities than their Republican counterparts.  More
than likely, this was due to gerrymandered districts, where Democrats
were “packed” into liberal districts in order to reduce the impact that
they would have in surrounding districts, and were “cracked” in areas
where they had a large stronghold, so as to divide their impact among
multiple districts and to prevent them from forming a majority in any
single district.36
In an interview with the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Nicholas Goedert, a
redistricting expert from Washington University in St. Louis, stated,
“The key way a gerrymandering party is able to win more than its share
of seats is to pack the opposite partisans into a district where they con-
trol a huge amount of the vote and essentially waste their vote.”37  He
also said that Pennsylvania was “arguably the most distorted map in the
country in terms of comparing the vote share and the seats won.”38
Pennsylvania’s redistricting is a particularly egregious example of parti-
san gerrymandering, where in November 2012, voters cast 2,701,820
votes for Democrats and 2,626,995 votes for Republicans.39  Yet Penn-
sylvania’s new congressional delegation is not comprised of roughly the
same number of Republicans and Democrats—the state is only sending
five Democrats to the 113th Congress, while it is sending thirteen
Republicans.40
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/democrats-lost-decade-house-redistrict-
ing-midterms-93018.html.
34. Randy LoBosso, Pennsylvanians and Americans Voted for a Democratic U.S. House—
So Why Do Republicans Still Hold Huge Majorities?, PHILLYNOW (Nov. 8, 2012), http://blogs.
philadelphiaweekly.com/phillynow/2012/11/08/pennsylvanians-and-americans-voted-
for-a-democratic-u-s-house—so-why-do-republicans-still-hold-huge-majorities/.
35. Id.
36. See Sam Wang, Op-Ed, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013, at
SR5 (stating, “Gerrymandering is not hard.  The core technique is to jam voters likely to
favor your opponents into a few throwaway districts where the other side will win lopsided
victories, a strategy known as ‘packing.’  Arrange other boundaries to win close victories,
‘cracking’ opposition groups into many districts.”). See also Coll, supra note 9, (citing
Samuel Wang and arguing that “twenty-six seats out of the thirty-three-seat Republican
advantage in the House can be attributed to gerrymandering in states with legislatures
controlled by Republicans.”).
37. Timothy McNulty, How Gerrymandering Helped GOP Keep Control of House, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/news/us/how-gerry-
mandering-helped-gop-keep-control-of-house-663716/.
38. Id.
39. LoBosso, supra note 34.  But, Pennsylvania was not the only state in which the
party that won the most votes did not win at least half the seats. See Wang, supra note 36,
at SR1, SR5 (stating that in addition to Pennsylvania, Arizona, Michigan, North Carolina,
and Wisconsin were all states in which the party that won a majority of votes failed to win
at least half of the delegation’s seats).
40. LoBosso, supra note 34.
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Looking at specific examples of how Pennsylvania’s gerry-
mandered congressional districts played out, “Democrat Allyson
Schwartz beat Republican Joe Rooney by a tally of 205,287 to 92,415
and Bob Brady beat John Featherman 226,189 to 39,752,” while “would-
be swing districts like the 12th saw Republican Keith Rothfus beat Dem-
ocrat Mark Critz 51.5 percent to 48.5 percent.”41  Furthermore, Demo-
crats “carried both districts in the Philadelphia area — by 85 percent
and 89 percent, respectively — and three other districts, by 77, 69 and
61 percent.”42  On the other hand, “[o]f the 13 districts where Republi-
cans prevailed, GOP candidates won seven with less than 60 percent of
the vote; in only one district did the Republican candidate’s total
exceed 65 percent of the votes cast.”43
Understanding the realities of gerrymandering, political parties
know that having partisan and ideologically friendly districts can help
them withstand opposing political forces.  Political expenditures cor-
roborate this.  The Republican State Leadership Committee, in its
REDMAP 2012 Summary Report, essentially patted itself on the back
for money it spent in state legislative races in 2010 to ensure that the
Republicans would control congressional (and state legislative) redis-
tricting in key states:
Controlling the redistricting process in [states projected to gain or
lose Congressional representation] would have the greatest
impact on determining how both state legislative and congres-
sional district boundaries would be drawn.  Drawing new district
lines in states with the most redistricting activity presented the
opportunity to solidify conservative policymaking at the state level
and maintain a Republican stronghold in the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives for the next decade.44
The report provided financial amounts spent in various states to
support key state legislative races, including $1.4 million in New York,
$1 million in Pennsylvania, $1 million in Ohio, and $1 million in Michi-
gan.45  Simply put, “[t]he $30 million strategy consist[ed] of two steps
for tilting the playing field: take over state legislatures before the decen-
nial Census, then redraw state and Congressional districts to lock in
partisan advantages.”46
The purpose of this Note is not to pick on Republican gerryman-
ders.  Democrats are guilty of the practice as well (although they were
41. Id.
42. Harold Meyerson, Op-Ed, GOP’s gerrymandered advantages, WASH. POST (Nov. 13,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/harold-meyerson-gops-gerry-
mandered-advantages/2012/11/13/4785e4d6-2d2f-11e2-a99d-5c4203af7b7a_story.html?
hpid=z2.
43. Id. For a map of the Pennsylvania Congressional districts following the gerry-
mandering, see Pennsylvania Congressional Districts, PENNSYLVANIA REDISTRICTING, http://
www.redistricting.state.pa.us/Resources/GISData/Districts/Congressional/2011/PDF/
2011-PA-Congressional-Map.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
44. REDMAP 2012 Summary Report, REPUBLICAN STATE LEADERSHIP COMM. (Jan. 4,
2013), http://rslc.com/_blog/News/post/REDMAP_2012_Summary_Report.
45. Id.
46. Wang, supra note 36, at SR1.
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not as effective as the Republicans during the cycle following the 2010
census).  For instance, after a Democratic-controlled gerrymander in
Illinois, the Democrats increased their ranks in their congressional del-
egation by five members in the last election, for a total of twelve of
eighteen seats.47
Historically, it has been common to see a disparity between the
national popular vote for congressional candidates and the percentage
of seats parties win in the House.  “From the end of World War II
through 1994, Democrats nationally won a bigger percentage of House
seats than their popular-vote total, probably due to the prevalence of
old-time Southern Democrats.”48  And then after the Republican
Revolution in 1994, in which the Republicans won control of the House
for the first time in a generation, “the GOP has outperformed its popu-
lar-vote total in the two decades since.”49  So, while this type of result
may seem normal, “[t]he GOP’s nearly 6 percent gap between votes
and seats won on Nov. 6 [2012] was the biggest for either party since
the Democrats last did it in 1992.”50
C. Increased Partisanship and Gridlock
Looking at the membership of ideological caucuses in the House
of Representatives shows how gerrymandering has impacted the make-
up of Congress.  In the 113th Congress, there are fifteen members of
the Congressional Blue Dog Coalition,51 a caucus comprised of moder-
ate Democrats, while there are seventy-four House members of the
more liberal Congressional Progressive Caucus.52  On the Republican
side, there are fifty-five House members of the Republican Main Street
Partnership,53 a moderate Republican group, while there are 168 mem-
bers of the Republican Study Committee,54 which is comprised of the
most conservative members of the Republican caucus.  This shows that
the more ideological wings of the Democratic and Republican parties
outweigh the moderates.  This can be attributed to gerrymandering.  Of
47. Meyerson, supra note 42.  However, while the Democrats did increase their rep-
resentation in Illinois, Meyerson points out that this more closely resembles the political
leanings of the state, which voted for President Obama by a sixteen-point margin. Id.  For
additional examples of partisan gerrymandering in other states, see Chris Christoff &
Greg Giroux, Republicans Foil What Majority Wants by Gerrymandering, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 18,
2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-18/republicans-foil-what-
most-u-s-wants-with-gerrymandering.html (discussing examples of partisan gerrymander-
ing in Michigan and Ohio).
48. McNulty, supra note 37.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing data from the University of Virginia Center for Politics).
51. Blue Dog Membership, BLUE DOG COALITION, bluedogdems.ngpvanhost.com/con-
tent/blue-dog-membership-1 (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
52. What is CPC?, CONGRESSIONAL PROGRESSIVE CAUCUS, cpc.grijalva.house.gov/cau-
cus-members/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
53. RMSP Members, REPUBLICAN MAIN STREET PARTNERSHIP, www.republicanmain-
street.org/members/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
54. RSC Member List, RSC, http://rsc.scalise.house.gov/aboutrsc/members (last vis-
ited Apr. 8, 2014).
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course, with more ideologically members of the House, compromise is
rare and the legislative process is increasingly gridlocked.
It is important to note that the increased number of ideological
members of the House of Representatives is not due to an increasingly
partisan electorate.  In fact, today’s electorate is actually less partisan
than in the past.  According to a study by the Pew Research Center for
People and the Press, in 2012, thirty-eight percent of the electorate con-
sidered themselves independent, thirty-two percent identified with the
Democratic Party, and twenty-four percent identified with the Republi-
can Party.  This is in contrast to most years since 1939 where more peo-
ple identified with the Democratic Party or with both major parties than
as independents.55
Nate Silver has observed that by not compromising with oppo-
nents, “individual members of Congress are responding fairly rationally
to their incentives. Most members of the House now come from
hyperpartisan districts where they face essentially no threat of losing
their seat to the other party.  Instead, primary challenges, especially for
Republicans, may be the more serious risk.”56  This is true, especially
given that
[o]ne of the firmest conclusions of academic research into the
behavior of Congress is that what motivates members first and
foremost is winning elections.  If individual members of Congress
have little chance of losing their seats if they fail to compromise,
there should be little reason to expect them to do so.”57
But, the effects are not limited to electoral politics.  In acting to
protect themselves from ideological primary challenges, they vote for
policy “that voters in more competitive districts would not long counte-
nance.”58 And the gridlock could also lead to shutting down the federal
government.59
Common Cause has argued that, in addition to facilitating congres-
sional gridlock,  “gerrymandering contributes to alienation by reducing
the impact that voters can have on elections; weakens incentives for
legislators to satisfy constituents; and weakens political parties by
55. Trend in Party Identification 1939 – 2012, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE
& THE PRESS (June 1, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/06/01/trend-in-party-
identification-1939-2012/.
56. Silver, supra note 4.
57. Id. See also Shannon McGovern, Who is to Blame for Washington Gridlock?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/
2012/08/23/who-is-to-blame-for-washington-gridlock.
58. Coll, supra note 9. But see Nolan McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polari-
zation?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666 (2009) (presenting an empirical argument that partisan
gerrymandering is not the cause of increased partisan gridlock and that it can be attrib-
uted to other factors) and Jamelle Bouie, Don’t Blame Gerrymandering, AM. PROSPECT (Nov.
21, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/dont-blame-gerrymandering (arguing that “there
isn’t much evidence for the claim that partisan gerrymandering is responsible for height-
ened polarization” and that “[t]he increase in polarization among lawmakers has more to
do with changes in political parties, party leadership, and issue priorities than it does
gerrymandering.”).
59. Coll, supra note 9.
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allowing them to field less qualified candidates.”60  These effects could
also be additional causes of gridlock in Congress.
D. The Influence of Technology on Gerrymandering
Recent technological advances have allowed gerrymandering to
become more precise.  But, the precision is really just a more accurate
version of what has been going on for decades.  “Both parties rely on
sophisticated computer programs . . . .”61  The software is essentially
doing what mapmakers have always done—crack or pack—with more
efficiency.62
Specifically, new “[t]echnological developments have enabled
mapmakers to augment their knowledge of the state’s political environ-
ment with (1) precinct-level data about the electorate and (2) com-
puter programs that can generate maps custom-fitted to meet any
group’s needs.”63  New software “has vastly increased the speed with
which mapmakers can generate plans and calculate the effects of any
changes to a plan.”64  They can also take voting trends into considera-
tion.  For instance, “[t]he state lawmakers can build databases with
detailed voter registration figures, election results and population data
to project campaign outcomes and demographic trends.”65
However, “computers are only a tool, not an end in themselves.
They may expand the set of possible redistricting plans, but that does
not mean that those in charge have to choose any particular one.  The
real choices are made by those drawing the districts . . . .”66
E. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Partisan Redistricting
1. Early Cases
While Congress has continued to legislate on redistricting and has
established some parameters, the Supreme Court has also weighed in
on the subject.  In 1975, it ruled that “reapportionment is primarily the
duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other
body . . . .”67  However, in 1986, in Davis v. Bandemer,68 “the Supreme
Court ruled that partisan gerrymanders were justiciable,”69 bringing
60. JEREMY BUCHMAN, DRAWING LINES IN QUICKSAND: COURTS, LEGISLATURES, &
REDISTRICTING 194 (2003).
61. Michael Cooper, How to Tilt an Election Through Redistricting, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 25,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/09/26/weekinreview/26marsh.html.
62. See id.
63. BUCHMAN, supra note 60, at 118.
64. Id. at 186.
65. Christoff & Giroux, supra note 47.
66. Micah Altman et. al., Pushbutton Gerrymanders?  How Computing Has Changed
Redistricting, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICT-
ING 51, 63 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005).
67. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975).
68. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
69. MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE?: PARTISAN REPRESENTA-
TION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 11 (1993).
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upon itself a “reapportionment revolution.”70  Justice White, writing for
the majority and establishing the justiciability of partisan gerrymanders,
wrote,
Disposition of the case does not involve this Court in a matter
more properly decided by a coequal branch of the Government.
There is no risk of foreign or domestic disturbance.  Nor is this
Court persuaded that there are no judicially discernible and man-
ageable standards by which political gerrymandering cases are to
be decided.71
2. Recent Cases
While the Court tried to clarify the justiciability issue in Bandemer, a
plurality sought to overrule that justiciability ruling in Veith v. Jubelirer.72
Writing for the plurality and acknowledging Bandemer’s unworkable
standard, Justice Scalia wrote,
Eighteen years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to show for
it justify us in revisiting the question whether the standard prom-
ised by Bandemer exists. As the following discussion reveals, no
judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating
political gerrymandering claims have emerged. Lacking them, we
must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusti-
ciable and that Bandemer was wrongly decided.73
However, although concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy
disagreed, saying that there are potential cases in which partisan gerry-
manders could have a negative impact on constitutional rights.  Ulti-
mately, he concurred with the plurality’s result, but not with the
justiciability issue.  He said, “If workable standards [on political gerry-
manders] do emerge to measure these burdens, however, courts should
be prepared to order relief.”74  Therefore, it is still possible for the
Supreme Court, and other federal courts, to hear complaints regarding
political gerrymanders.  Nevertheless, the standard by which a court will
hear such a complaint is still not clear.
3. The Roberts Court’s Jurisprudence on Redistricting
a. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry75
After the 2002 elections, Republicans in Texas gained control of
the state house for the first time in 130 years.76  Following his party’s
70. Id.  Rush argues that this was actually the “second reapportionment revolution,”
with the first “erupt[ing] in the early 1960s, when the Court first chose to hear reappor-
tionment cases, previously avoided because they involved political questions.” Id.
71. Davis, 478 U.S. at 110.
72. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
73. Id. at 281.
74. Id. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
76. Overview and History, REPUBLICAN PARTY OF TEX., http://www.texasgop.org/over-
view-and-history (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).  Democrats were able to hold on to control of
Texas and other southern states following the collapse of the “Solid South” because of
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electoral gains, Republican Tom DeLay, then Majority Leader in the
House of Representatives, encouraged the state party to pass “legisla-
tion . . . to redraw the Congressional map in [the Republicans’]
favor.”77  While it was unusual for a state to redistrict congressional
lines in the middle of a decade, the legislation received national atten-
tion when the state house’s Democrats, in a failing effort, fled the state
in order to not allow a quorum.78  It was also evident that the legislation
would have ramifications beyond Texas, given that it would ultimately
help the Republicans keep control of the House of Representatives.79
This gerrymandering was immediately criticized.  The New York
Times editorial board stated, “Texas’ Congressional district lines threw
aside the longstanding tradition that new lines are drawn only every 10
years, after the census. The purpose of this heavy-handed line-drawing
was purely to increase the number of Republican districts. It worked.”80
There were also charges of illegal minority voter voice dilution.81
Various plaintiffs brought suit against Rick Perry, the Republican
Governor of Texas, who had signed the redistricting bill into law.  Such
plaintiffs included the League of United Latin American Citizens, an
organization that “advances the economic condition, educational
attainment, political influence, health and civil rights of Hispanic
Americans through community-based programs;”82 Travis County,
Texas (the home of Austin); the American GI Forum of Texas, an
organization that “is dedicated to addressing problems of discrimina-
tion and inequities endured by Hispanic veterans;”83 and various other
citizens groups. The plaintiffs argued that:
the new [redistricting legislation was] an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander and that the redistricting statewide [violated] § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973. [The plaintiffs] also [contended] that the use of race and
politics in drawing lines of specific districts [violated] the First
gerrymandering.  Similarly, Republicans won control of the state legislatures in Alabama
and North Carolina for first time since Reconstruction in 2010.  Draper, supra note 18.
For further illustration, in 1990 Republicans did not control any chambers in any south-
ern state legislature.  Karen Hansen, A GOP Wave Washed Over State Legislatures on Election
Day, Red Tide: December 2010, NCSL: NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http:/
/www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/red-tide.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
77. David Barboza & Carl Hulse, Texas’ Republicans Fume; Democrats Remain AWOL,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A17.
78. Philip Shenon, Texas Legislative Dispute Goes National, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2003,
at A18.
79. Id.  For a map of Texas’s congressional districts for the 2002 elections, see Texas
Congressional Districts 2002 Elections, TEX. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/
redist/pdf/congress_historical/c_2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).   For a map of
Texas’s congressional districts for the 2004 elections, see Texas Congressional Districts 2004
Elections and 2006 Primaries, TEX. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/
pdf/congress_historical/c_2004_2006.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
80. Redistricting Tom DeLay, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at A34.
81. Id.
82. About Us, LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AM. CITIZENS, http://lulac.org/about/ (last
visited Apr. 8, 2014).
83. About the American GI Forum, AM. GI FORUM OF TEX., http://www.agiftx.org/
index.php?page=about.the.gi.forum (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
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Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”84
The lawsuit gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to expand or
to clarify its jurisprudence on the justiciability of challenges to partisan
gerrymanders.  Though now, the Court had a different make-up than
during its previous decisions.  John Roberts had just been named Chief
Justice the year prior, and Samuel Alito had also been named to the
Court.
Ultimately, the Court did “not revisit the justiciability holding [in
Veith] but [proceeded] to examine whether appellants’ claims offer[ed]
the Court a manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determining
whether a partisan gerrymander violates the Constitution.”85  The
Court reaffirmed its standard from Veith, saying that in order to success-
fully challenge an overtly-partisan and unconstitutional gerrymander,
“a successful claim . . . must do what appellants’ sole-motivation theory
explicitly disavows: show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard,
on the complainants’ representational rights.”86
In terms of partisan gerrymandering, the Roberts Court has left
state legislatures (and potential plaintiffs) with the status quo—essen-
tially, that a justiciable claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymander-
ing theoretically exists, albeit difficult to define.  However, the Court
did point out that even with Texas’s legislature “decid[ing] to redistrict
with the sole purpose of achieving a Republican congressional major-
ity . . . partisan aims did not guide every line it drew.”87  So, perhaps in
order for redistricting to be unconstitutional, every line drawn would
have to be motived by partisanship.
Nevertheless, the Court did find that other aspects of the mid-dec-
ade gerrymander were unconstitutional, but this was because Texas had
violated aspects of the Voting Rights Act.88  With a different majority
than the majority ruling on the partisan-gerrymander issue, the Court
ruled that changes to a particular district “violated Section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act because it diluted the voting power of Latinos.”89  Conse-
quently, after court orders, Texas adopted a new plan redrawing five
congressional districts including the district in question.90
84. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 409 (2006).
85. Id. at 414.
86. Id. at 418.
87. Id. at 417.
88. L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42482, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICT-
ING AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 4 (2012).
89. L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22479, CONGRESSIONAL REDIS-
TRICTING: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT RULING IN League of United Latin Ameri-
can Citizens v. Perry 6 (2008).
90. Id. For a map of Texas’s congressional districts following changes made from
LULAC, see TEXAS U.S. Congressional Districts Court-Ordered Districts LULAC v. Perry PLAN
01438C, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/pdf/chronology_plans/
PLAN1438C.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2014).
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b. Perry v. Perez91
Following the most recent round of redistricting after the 2010
census, additional litigation presented the Court another opportunity
to either expand or clarify its previous rulings regarding partisan gerry-
mandering.  Once again in Texas, various plaintiffs sued Governor Rick
Perry, alleging that the state’s most recent gerrymander “violate[d] the
United States Constitution and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.”92
At the time, “Texas [was] a ‘covered jurisdiction’ under Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”93  Essentially, covered jurisdictions
were required to receive federal “preclearance” for their maps before
they become law.94  To do this, states had to demonstrate that a “pro-
posed change ‘neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of deny-
ing or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.’”95
Since then, however, Shelby County v. Holder96 effectively neutered
the preclearance requirement.  The Supreme Court held Section 4 of
the Voting Rights Act, the section of the Act which contained the cover-
age formula, to be unconstitutional.97  Thus, although Section 5 was
not struck down, “it will have no actual effect unless and until Congress
can enact a new statute to determine who should be covered by it.”98
Nevertheless, because Texas was not going to meet its preclearance
obligation before an upcoming primary election, a district court
imposed a new map to avoid having an election without a pre-cleared
map.  This was also because Texas’s “old district lines could not be
used, because population growth had rendered them inconsistent with
the Constitution’s one-person, one-vote requirement.”99
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court provided guidelines
for district courts on how to best draw maps when the necessary situa-
tion arose, but in terms of general redistricting policy, it largely con-
firmed its previous jurisprudence.  For instance, the Court reaffirmed
that “[r]edistricting is ‘primarily the duty and responsibility of the
State.’”100  It also gave a specific example, saying that the district court
should have followed Texas’s example in splitting precincts in order to
come as close as possible to Texas’s map,101 thus implying that courts
should be as deferential as possible to state redistricting law.
91. 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012).
92. Id. at 940.  For a general discussion of the political effects of race-conscious
redistricting, see Stephen Wolf, Note, Race Ipsa: Vote Dilution, Racial Gerrymandering, and
the Presumption of Racial Discrimination, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 225
(1997).
93. Perry, 134 S. Ct. at 939.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 940 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2012)).
96. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
97. Id. at 2616.
98. Amy Howe, Details on Shelby County v. Holder: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG,
(June 25, 2013, 11:03 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/details-on-shelby-
county-v-holder-in-plain-english.
99. Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 940 (2012).
100. Id. (quoting Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)).
101. Id. at 943.
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In summation, the case did not clarify the vagueness that sur-
rounded gerrymandering.  It is still not clear what could be considered
an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.102  But what we are left with
is that, at this point, both Congress and the Supreme Court have been
highly deferential to the states to determine their own redistricting
policy.
II. ARGUMENT
In light of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on redistricting, and
when coupled with Congress’s historical silence on specifics, there
needs to be further guidance for state legislatures on how to redraw
legislative maps without the negative partisan consequences.  If the
Supreme Court will not supply that guidance, it is critical that Congress,
the state legislatures, or both, provide it.
If increased guidance is not provided, state legislatures will con-
tinue to maximize partisan gain through redistricting.  This will further
increase partisanship in Congress, resulting in higher levels of polariza-
tion and even more gridlock.  Simply put, this is bad for public policy
and harmful to the United States.
III. DISCUSSION
Gerrymandering is a “political disaster”103 because of the effects
that it has on the political system, on voters, on public policy and gov-
ernment services, and on public officials.
A. Practical Consequences
Given that there has not been much guidance from the Supreme
Court, state legislatures have free reign to draw districts, as long as they
comply with minimal federal restrictions.  As previously mentioned,104
states must draw contiguous districts of roughly equal population, and
they must respond to changes in the population following each decadal
census.  They may even make gerrymandering a more frequent
occurrence.
Specifically, after the Supreme Court’s ruling in League of United
Latin American Citizens, “commentators have observed other states may
dispense with the tradition of redrawing congressional districts only
once per decade following the decennial census, and instead, redistrict
following a change in political control of the state government.”105
102. For additional information on the muddled state of partisan gerrymandering
case law, see Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law: Partisan Gerrymandering and a
Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097 (2007).
103. AMY, supra note 3, at 59.
104. See supra Part I (discussing federal laws requiring states to comply with various
standards when redrawing maps).
105. WHITAKER, supra note 88, at 6.  The report, however, also noted that “there
does not appear to be any urgency on the part of state legislatures to [redistrict more
than once per decade].” Id.
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Gerrymandering also causes districts to not have rational shapes.
Many are often weirdly shaped, sometimes with no logical bounda-
ries.106  This can create confusion for constituents and voters, who may
not know which district they live in.
B. Impact on Partisanship
As already mentioned, gerrymandering creates more partisan dis-
tricts and thus facilitates the election of more partisan representa-
tives.107  Speaking about what is wrong in Washington on Meet the Press,
Tom Brokaw said,
The fact is the system is rigged. Seventy-five percent of the con-
gressmen come from gerrymandered districts in which they’re
bulletproof. They only play to one constituency. There are no
swing states. They don’t go home and have to prove their case,
because they’ve got a choir back home. And that’s a huge part of
the problem here.108
Nate Silver estimated that out of the 435 seats of the House of Rep-
resentatives, only thirty-five are swing districts.109  Similarly, in its final
“race ratings” before the November 2012 election, the Cook Political
Report listed only twenty-nine toss-up races in the entire House.110
Likewise, the New York Times listed twenty-five seats as toss-ups,111 Roll
Call listed twenty-eight,112 and the Rothenberg Political Report listed
eighteen as pure toss-ups.113
As a consequence, the only time many incumbents will face a real
possibility of losing an election is when they are challenged in a pri-
mary.114  This increases the likelihood that incumbents representing
non-competitive districts will pander to the ideologically extremes of
their parties, which will generate further extremism in Congress as a
whole.
106. See Zombie, The Top Ten Most Gerrymandered Congressional Districts in the United
States, PJ MEDIA (Nov. 11, 2010, 1:30 PM), http://pjmedia.com/zombie/2010/11/11/
the-top-ten-most-gerrymandered-congressional-districts-in-the-united-states/?singlepage=
true.  For a historical perspective on the shape of Congressional districts, see KENNETH C.
MARTIS, THE HISTORIAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1789-
1989 (1989) (detailing various maps that show the Congressional districts in each of the
Congresses between 1789 and 1989).
107. See supra Part I.C, Increased Partisanship and Gridlock.
108. Tom Brokaw, The System is Rigged, MEET THE PRESS, video available at http://
www.politico.com/blogs/politico-live/2012/12/brokaw-the-system-is-rigged-152993.html.
109. See Silver, supra note 4.
110. 2012 House Race Ratings for November 5, 2012, THE COOK POLITICAL REPORT
(Nov. 5, 2012), http://cookpolitical.com/house/charts/race-ratings/5105.
111. Jennifer Steinhauer et al., House Race Ratings, included in Election 2012, N.Y.
TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/ratings/house (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
112. Race Ratings for 2012 House Elections, ROLL CALL, http://www.rollcall.com/
politics/race-ratings-chart-2012-house-elections.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
113. House Ratings, ROTHENBERG POLITICAL REPORT (Nov. 2, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://
rothenbergpoliticalreport.com/ratings/house.
114. So, a Democrat may be challenged from the liberal wing of the party while a
Republican may be challenged from the conservative wing of the party.
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Another consequence of gerrymandering is that it facilitates the
selection of ideologically extreme House members as committee chairs.
This is primarily because both parties, in most circumstances, select
committee chairs based on the length of their committee tenure.115
The members representing non-competitive districts—those most likely
to obtain seniority—are those who are incentivized to be more ideologi-
cally extreme.  In contrast, moderate members are not likely to obtain
the seniority necessary to become a committee chair because they are
more likely to lose elections, either to a more ideologically extreme
member in a primary, or in a general election because they represent a
swing district.  The same logic applies to ranking committee members
in the minority party, thus making gridlock more likely because com-
mittee counterparts would come from their parties’ more ideologically
extreme factions.
C. Impact on Voter Turnout and Voter Apathy
While redistricting may be conducted under the guise of “one per-
son, one vote,”116 it can have the practical consequence of rendering a
person’s vote pointless.  “[U]nbridled gerrymandering undercuts indi-
vidual choice, eroding the ability of each voter to express a preference
for a particular candidate with a fair and realistic chance that his candi-
date may win.”117  For instance, if someone lives in a congressional dis-
trict in which the results of an election, based on the partisan make-up
of the district, are easily predictable, a voter may not have an incentive
to vote.  “Gerrymandering . . . is arguably the greatest structural barrier
to the people’s right and responsibility to participate in politics in a
meaningful and impactful manner.”118  Thus, gerrymandering can con-
tribute to complacency or apathy among American voters.
1. Voter Turnout
People are more likely to vote in competitive races than in races
where the outcome appears predetermined.119  This may seem to be a
given, but it can have rippling effects.  Just like there are “feature acts”
that bring people out a the concert on Friday night, “opening acts” ben-
efit from the heightened attention the feature brings.  Likewise, there
115. See Jennifer Bendery, House GOP Committee Chairs Will All Be White Men In Next
Congress, HUFFPOST POLITICS (Nov. 27, 2012, 8:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/11/27/house-committee-chairs-all-white-men_n_2201136.html (“House committee
chairs are typically chosen based on their seniority on the committee . . . .”).
116. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
117. DAVID K. RYDEN, REPRESENTATION IN CRISIS: THE CONSTITUTION, INTEREST
GROUPS, AND POLITICAL PARTIES 138 (1996).
118. Ramon Luzarraga, The Kids on the Hill (or How Gerrymandering is the Single Larg-
est Barrier to Citizens’ Right and Responsibility to Participation), CATHOLIC MORAL THEOLOGY
(Dec. 30, 2012), http://catholicmoraltheology.com/the-kids-on-the-hill-and-how-to-send-
adults-there-or-make-the-incumbents-grow-up/.
119. See David S. Broder, Voting’s Neglected Scandal, WASH. POST, June 26, 2008, at
A19. See also Marc Dunkelman, Gerrymandering the Vote: How a “Dirty Dozen” States Suppress
as Many as 9 Million Voters 7, DLC, http://www.dlc.org/specials/Gerrymandering_the_
Vote.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
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are “feature elections” that bring people to the polls and lesser elec-
tions that are unable to generate attention by themselves. So, just like
there can be repercussions for the opening acts if the feature act
cancels, other races, besides the marquee race, can be affected if the
congressional race is a snoozer.  The same studies have shown that if
races become more competitive, voter turnout, and thus overall govern-
ment participation rates, increases.120
2. Voter Choice
Because of gerrymandering, voters may not have a real choice as to
who to vote for during an election, if there is even a challenger.121
Either the outcome is preordained because the district is so gerry-
mandered, or there might not even be anyone challenging the incum-
bent.122  Some have even called this type of system “a major form of
disenfranchisement.”123  People may be going through the motions
when they go to the voting booth on Election Day, or as previously
stated, they may not go at all.
D. Impact on Public Policy
Gerrymandering also has a direct effect on public policy, namely,
in that it “slow[s] or forestall[s] representative responsiveness to the
changes in the current of public sentiment.”124  It also reduces “the
public’s ability to hold its governors accountable, hence discrediting
the governmental actions and outcomes which follow.”125
Similarly, gerrymandering facilitates bad policy outcomes.  For
instance, leaving aside the political goals of not raising the country’s
debt ceiling, America is worse off for having a lower debt rating than it
did before the debt ceiling fight of 2011.126  And, America is worse off
120. Id.
121. See Editorial, Jesse and Gerrymandering, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 21, 2013, at 18.  The
Tribune argues that incumbents in heavily gerrymandered districts often have large cam-
paign coffers, which can intimidate potential challengers and dissuade them from run-
ning for Congress.  Of course, this can be true of any incumbent, but the inference is that
incumbents in heavily gerrymandered districts have larger war chests because they do not
need to spend money on campaigning.
122. Some have stated that partisan gerrymandering increases the number of
incumbents who win reelection.  However, there are arguments against that. See Bouie,
supra note 58 (arguing that “there are reams of political-science research showing that
partisan gerrymandering is low on the list of factors that explain the rising incumbency
rate.”).  However, the rising incumbency rate is not crucial to my argument.  It is enough
that gerrymandering artificially increases the likelihood that one party’s candidate will
beat the other’s.
123. Wang, supra note 36, at SR5.
124. RYDEN, supra note 117, at 139.
125. Id.
126. America is worse off because it has a lower debt rating from Standard & Poors.
See Abelbaum & Dash, supra note 7. See also Jeanne Sahadi, Cost of Debt Ceiling Fight: $1.3
Billion, CNNMONEY (July 26, 2012, 10:49 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/23/
news/economy/debt-limit/index.htm (saying that the uncertainty in ability to borrow
caused the federal government to have to pay an extra $1.3 billion leading up to the debt
ceiling showdown).
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after having its government shutdown because various services could
not be performed.  It is likely that a less-gridlocked Congress would
have acted to avoid these situations in the first place.
E. Impact on Public Officials
Finally, gerrymandering reduces the incentive that elected officials
have to respond to constituents.  This stems from an economic analysis
of the incentives that members typically have while they are in Con-
gress.  “Influenced by law and economics, public choice theory makes
the . . . assumption that individuals are motivated exclusively by self-
interest.  Thus, legislators are motivated primarily by the desire to be
reelected . . . .”127  But if reelection in gerrymandered districts is
assured, then legislators lose the motivation to act in a manner that
would help to ensure their electoral success.
Essentially, members of Congress from heavily gerrymandered dis-
tricts, because of the preordained electoral outcomes in those districts,
take it for granted that they will be reelected.  Consequently, members
of Congress may not listen to the opinions of the entire electorate in
their district—they may only care about the opinions of primary vot-
ers.128  In an interview, President Obama stated, “The House Republi-
can majority is made up mostly of members who are in sharply
gerrymandered districts that are very safely Republican and may not
feel compelled to pay attention to broad-based public opinion, because
what they’re really concerned about is the opinions of their specific
Republican constituencies.”129  Worse yet, there may be members, due
to a combination of partisan primaries and gerrymandering, who do
not listen to any public opinion.130  They may only listen to special
interests.  When donors give money to members of Congress from ger-
rymandered districts, they “know they’re buying access to members of
Congress who are sure to win the election – a tacit assurance that the
contribution is money well-invested.”131
127. Edward Rubin, Rational States?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1433, 1440 (1997) (citations
omitted).
128. This can be true of any district in which the general election outcomes are
preordained, whether or not it from partisan redistricting.  However, gerrymandering
increases this likelihood.
129. Franklin Foer & Chris Hughes, Barack Obama is Not Pleased:  The President on His
Enemies, the Media, and the Future of Football, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/112190/obama-interview-2013-sit-down-president.  Of course
the same logic would also apply to Democrats.
130. “[I]f the combination of partisan primaries and bipartisan gerrymandering are
resulting in a legislature that cannot be said to be broadly responsive to the American
people, then we may have identified a cause of actual democratic dysfunction.”  Josh
Chavetz, The Phemonology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2086 (2013) (citing
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in
America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 297–319 (2011)).
131. Editorial, supra note 121, at 18.
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IV. RESPONSES TO GERRYMANDERING
As previously mentioned, Congress and the Supreme Court have
given states much autonomy in redistricting.  But with this autonomy,
states have responded differently.  Some states, like Pennsylvania and
Texas, have continued to partisanly draft congressional districts, aiming
to exact as much political gain from the process as possible.  A few
states have taken a middle of the road approach.  Others have aban-
doned the practice of partisan redistricting in favor of other processes.
Similarly, other countries have also abandoned partisan redistricting in
favor of having neutral commissions redraw legislative boundary lines.
A. California
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger led a ballot initiative fight to
overhaul California’s redistricting process in 2008.132  Proposition 11
ultimately established the California Citizens Redistricting Commission,
which, in addition to drafting the state’s legislative seats, also drafts the
map for all of its congressional districts.133  This essentially took the
redistricting power out of the state legislature, and gave it to a non-
partisan commission.
The commission is comprised of eight members: “three who are
Democrats, three who are Republican, and two who are either Decline-
to-State or are registered with another party.”134  The eight members
were chosen randomly from a pool of twenty-four people, which had
been whittled down from a larger pool of the sixty most qualified indi-
viduals who had applied to be on the commission.135  Following the
selection of the eight members, those eight then chose six more mem-
bers to bring the commission to a total of fourteen.136
The commission was tasked with drawing legislative boundaries fol-
lowing the 2010 decadal census.  Throughout this process, the
Commission
[drew] the district lines in conformity with strict, nonpartisan
rules designed to create districts of relatively equal population
that will provide fair representation for all Californians. The Com-
mission [held] public hearings and accept[ed] public comment.
After hearing from the public and drawing the maps for the
House of Representatives districts, 40 Senate districts, 80 Assembly
132. John Wildermuth, Redistricting Victory a Big Win for Governor, SFGATE (Nov. 27,
2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Redistricting-victory-a-big-win-
for-governor-3260386.php.
133. Gregory Giroux, Grading California’s Congressional Map, POLITICAL CAPITAL: THE
CURRENCY OF GOVERNMENT (Dec. 18, 2012, 2:31 PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/political-
capital/2012-12-18/grading-californias-congressional-map/.
134. Background on Commission, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://
wedrawthelines.ca.gov/commission.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
135. Id.  Part of the whittling down process included an opportunity for California
legislative leaders to strike some of those who were in the pool. Id.
136. Id.
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districts, and four Board of Equalization districts, the Commission
[voted] on the new maps to be used for the next decade.137
Under the new system of redistricting, California saw a lot of
change.  For instance, in the previous ten years, only one congressional
seat changed parties.138  However, after the 2012 elections, which were
the first to take place after redistricting done with the new system, four
seats changed parties.139
In establishing a non-partisan commission, California essentially
tried to take politics out of redistricting.  While there are still districts
that heavily favor one party, that is mostly due to the political tenden-
cies of established communities contained within one district, rather
than the artificial line-drawing designed to sway elections.  The efforts
in California have largely been successful.  “The result is that California
no longer has divided, gridlocked government, as it has had for the past
decade.”140
Other states that have non-partisan processes include Washington,
Idaho, and Arizona.141
B. Iowa
Some states have also successfully utilized non-partisan procedures,
while not necessarily handing the entire process over to a non-partisan
independent entity.  For instance, “Iowa’s redistricting process is han-
dled by the non-partisan Legislative Services Agency.  It draws the
boundaries based on population data and presents it to the Legislature
for approval.”142  Iowa’s non-political process has led to more competi-
tive elections, and, because it also draws state legislative districts, has led
to small majorities in the state legislature.143  Furthermore, Iowa has
other rules for redrawing congressional districts, including that districts
cannot divide counties, counties in the district must be contiguous, dis-
tricts should be reasonably compact, and the population of each district
cannot deviate from the ideal population size by more than one
percent.144
137. Id.
138. See Adam Nagourney, California Set to Send Many New Faces to Washington, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/us/california-congres-
sional-delegation-braces-for-change.html?pagewanted=all.
139. Kitty Felde, Redistricting Shakes Up California’s Congressional Races; Bono Mack
Trailing, 89.3 KPCC – Represent! (Nov. 7, 2012, 8:34 AM), http://www.scpr.org/blogs/
politics/2012/11/07/10948/redistricting-shakes-californias-congressional-rac/.
140. Coll, supra note 9.
141. Who Draws the Lines?, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.lls.edu/
who.php (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
142. James Q. Lynch, Iowa Redistricting Process, Split Legislature Linked, GAZETTE (Dec.
3, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://thegazette.com/2012/12/03/iowa-redistricting-process-split-
legislature-linked/.
143. Id.
144. Census 2010: Redistricting, DESMOINESREGISTER.COM, http://data.desmoinesre-
gister.com/dmr/iowa-census/redistricting-game/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
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C. Florida
Unlike California, Florida’s state legislature has not delegated its
power to redraw congressional districts to a non-partisan commission.
However, Florida has shown constraint in gerrymandering.  Specifically,
in November 2010, Florida’s citizens voted to amend the state constitu-
tion to prevent overly partisan redistricting.145  In regards to congres-
sional redistricting, Florida’s constitution now reads:
No apportionment plan or individual district shall be drawn with
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent;
and districts shall not be drawn with the intent or result of deny-
ing or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language
minorities to participate in the political process or to diminish
their ability to elect representatives of their choice; and districts
shall consist of contiguous territory.146
  While the new method of redistricting might have had some impact
on the elections, many are not satisfied with the system—people want to
have something that takes the process entirely out of the hands of poli-
ticians.147  There are charges that “Florida’s legislative leaders appear
to have authorized their staff to use private email accounts, personal
‘dropboxes’ and to engage in ‘brainstorming meetings’ with Republi-
can Party of Florida consultants in attempting to draw favorable politi-
cal districts, despite a constitutional ban on such coordination.”148
While these are three different methods, other states utilize differ-
ent systems to try to prevent or limit partisan gerrymandering.  These
systems include advisory commissions, backup commissions, and politi-
cian commissions.149  However, the vast majority of states still leave the
system to the elected, partisan state officials in the state legislatures.150
D. International Examples of Redistricting
Other countries’ efforts to limit and reduce partisanship through
redistricting are good examples for the United States.  In the United
Kingdom, redistricting is referred to as “redistribution.”  Independent
boundary commissions in each of the four countries that comprise the
United Kingdom redraw the boundaries of parliamentary constituen-
cies.  For instance, “[t]he Boundary Commission for England is an
independent and impartial public body, which reviews all Parliamentary
145. See Redistricting, FAIRDISTRICTSNOW.ORG, http://www.fairdistrictsnow.org/redis-
tricting/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
146. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 20(a).
147. See Redistricting, supra note 145.
148. S.V. Da´te, In Florida, an Email Trail on Redistricting Raises Questions, KPBS (Feb.
5, 2013), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/feb/05/in-florida-an-email-trail-on-redistrict-
ing-raises/. See Editorial, Fixing the Political Game, HERALD-TRIBUNE, Feb. 13, 2013, at A10
(arguing that even after the changes in Florida law, party officials were still able to push-
through partisan gerrymandering in the state).
149. See Who Draws the Lines?, supra note 141.
150. Id.
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constituency boundaries . . . every five years.”151  Similarly, the Bound-
ary Commission for Scotland is an “Advisory Non-departmental Public
Body sponsored and wholly funded by the Scotland Office. [It is] inde-
pendent and non-political.”152
In an effort to address unfairness in a previous method of con-
ducting redistribution, Parliament included revisions to its system in
the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act of 2011.153
Under the new legislation, boundaries are redrawn every five years, and
“all constituencies (with four exceptions) have electorates within +/-5
per cent of [a] quota . . . and only within that range could the Commis-
sions take into account factors such as local authority boundaries, com-
munities of interest and previous constituency boundaries.”154
Ultimately, the Commissions offer their plans to Parliament, “which can
accept or reject, but not modify, them.”155  However, “[a] Secretary of
State can modify the recommendations before transmitting them to
Parliament.”156
In Canada, historically “redistributions at both the federal and pro-
vincial levels . . . were carried out by elected politicians.”157  “A partisan
committee of the House itself” drew the boundaries of electoral dis-
tricts, which in Canada are called “ridings.”158
Like individual states in the United States, Canadian provinces also
proposed their own solutions. “The province of Manitoba was the first
Canadian jurisdiction to pass legislation mandating the establishment
of an arms-length, nonpartisan boundary commission once every ten
years.”159  The problems that stemmed from gerrymandering in Mani-
toba were particularly egregious, which led to the change.160  Interest-
ingly, Manitoba “looked to Australia and New Zealand as possible
sources for an acceptable alternative to government-dominated gerry-
151. About, BOUNDARY COMM’N FOR ENG., http://consultation.boundarycommission
forengland.independent.gov.uk/about-the-review/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
152. The Commission – Functions and Appointments, BOUNDARY COMM’N FOR SCOT.,
http://www.bcomm-scotland.independent.gov.uk/commission/ (last visited Apr. 8,
2014).  Scotland’s Boundary Commission is responsible for redistribution for “UK Parlia-
ment constituencies in Scotland; and Scottish Parliament constituencies and regions.” Id.
153. David Rossiter et al., The Redistribution of Parliamentary Constituencies (and What
it Means), BALLOTS & BULLETS (July 4, 2012), http://nottspolitics.org/2012/07/04/the-
redistribution-of-parliamentary-constituencies-and-what-it-means/.
154. Id.  Previously, the “rules prioritised representation of communities over elec-
toral equality – they made no stipulation regarding the permissible range of constituency
electorates, which merely had to be ‘as near the electoral quota as is practicable.’” Id.
(citations omitted).
155. Ron Johnston, et al., The United Kingdom: Redistribution Process, ACE:  THE ELEC-
TORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdy/bdy_gb (last
visited Apr. 8, 2014).
156. Id.
157. John C. Courtney, Electoral Districting in the U.S.: Can Canada Help?, BROOKINGS
INST. GOVERNANCE STUDIES: ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE STUDIES 1, 4 (2008).
158. Redistricting: Something Canada Does Better, FILIBUSTER (Mar. 1, 2011), http://
www.filibustercartoons.com/index.php/2011/03/01/redistricting-something-canada-
does-better/.
159. Courtney, supra note 157, at 5.
160. Id.
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manders . . . . [Manitoba] found [its] answer in the independent electo-
ral boundary commissions used in both countries.”161
But Canada’s problems from gerrymandering were not limited to
Manitoba, and in 1964, the Canadian government passed the Electoral
Boundaries Readjustment Act:162
Under the terms of the new legislation, parliamentary rid-
ings could henceforth only be modified by special non-parti-
san committees residing in each province. Each redistricting
committee would consist of one provincial judge and two individu-
als appointed by Canada’s apolitical Speaker of the House, and
their decisions could only be overturned by parliament in the case
of exceptional, and provable, concern.163
The Act also provided guidance for what should be taken into con-
sideration when drawing boundary lines.  For instance, district lines
were to take communities of interest or identity into account, and also
“set limits on the degree to which borders were allowed to deviate from
their historic status quo.”164  But the Canadians have leeway to meet
these goals because, as it was historically in Britain, they allow a fair
amount of deviation in population among their districts.165  Specifi-
cally, each electoral district in a province must be within twenty-five per-
cent more or less of the electoral quota for the province.166
V. RECOMMENDATION
Even with the advances made by states to address partisan redis-
tricting and the problems associated with it, Parts I, III, and IV clearly
show that gerrymandering is still a huge problem in the American polit-
ical system.  Many individuals and institutions have argued that the
practice of partisan redistricting needs to be abandoned, and different
people have argued for various alternatives.167  As stated in Part III, if
the Supreme Court will not provide guidance on what state legislatures
can do during redistricting, it is critical that the state legislatures, Con-
gress, or both, provide it.
The guidance, as passed by state legislatures, should be specific
and should mandate that communities are kept in the same congres-
sional districts and that districts are not drawn solely for partisan gain.
These guidelines will help to keep districts compact, will help people
161. Id.
162. Redistricting: Something Canada Does Better, supra note 158.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Richard S. Katz, Malapportionment and Gerrymandering in Other Countries and
Alternative Electoral Systems, in VOTING RIGHTS AND REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES
245, 253 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998).
166. Id.
167. See generally Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75
TEX. L. REV. 837 (1997). See also AMY, supra note 3, at 52–53 (arguing that “eliminating
gerrymandering in all of its forms can only be accomplished by abandoning the single-
member districts that make it possible and by adopting proportional representation
elections.”).
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understand and know district boundaries, and will help members of
Congress represent a cohesive community.  Ideally, the guidance would
also mandate independent, non-partisan redistricting commissions
because they take the process out of the hands of interested politicians.
California’s system is a model to emulate because its independent redis-
tricting commission is able to redraw lines without paying attention to
party affiliation or incumbency, and has helped to end the state’s past
legislative gridlock.  Finally, because it is important for citizens to have
some say in redistricting, guidelines should model the United King-
dom’s practice of giving Parliament an up or down vote on new district
lines after they are submitted by the boundary commission.
Preferably, Congress would ultimately pass legislation to encourage
or mandate that the states that have not yet adopted the aforemen-
tioned practices do so.  Members of Congress have already introduced
legislation to mandate independent state redistricting commissions.  In
the 113th Congress, Congressman Steven Cohen of Tennessee intro-
duced the John Tanner Fairness and Independence in Redistricting
Act.168  This bill had been championed by Congressman John Tanner
of Tennessee during his two-decade career in the House of Representa-
tives, and had also been introduced by Congressman Heath Shuler in
the 112th Congress.169  In introducing the Act, Cohen said:
It’s time to take politics out of the redistricting process.  Congress
is so polarized today that we’re unable to find common ground on
the major issues facing our country.  Instead of solving our
nation’s problems, Congress is just kicking the can down the road
and waiting until the next election for answers.  I believe that if we
eliminate the gerrymandering of districts we will help get more
accomplished for our country.170
Specifically, the bill would prevent more than one redistricting
after each apportionment of Representatives in Congress.171  It also
requires that “the redistricting plan [is] developed by [an] indepen-
dent redistricting commission established in the State . . . .”172  It fur-
ther requires that the independent redistricting commissions adhere
“to the ‘one person, one vote’ standard and other requirements
imposed under the Constitution of the United States,” and “[t]o the
greatest extent practicable, the maintenance of geographic continuity
of the political subdivisions of the State which are included in the same
Congressional district . . . .”173  The bill also states that to the greatest
168. John Tanner Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act, H.R. 278, 113th
Cong. (2013).
169. Cohen Introduces Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act, CONGRESSMAN
STEVE COHEN (Jan. 16, 2013), http://cohen.house.gov/press-release/cohen-introduces-
fairness-and-independence-redistricting-act.
170. Id.
171. H.R. 278 § 2.
172. Id. at § 3(a)(1)(A).
173. Id. at § 4(b)(1)(A), (D).  The statute gives an order of preference for main-
taining the continuity of subdivisions.  They are: counties or parishes, municipalities, and
neighborhoods. Id. at § 4(b)(1)(D).
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extent practicable, the commissions should maintain compact dis-
tricts.174  It also prohibits the commissions from considering “voting
history,” “political party affiliation of the population of the district,” and
“[t]he residence of incumbent Members of the House of Representa-
tives in the State.”175  Finally, as in the British system, the bill would give
state legislatures an opportunity to vote for the proposed redistricting,
or to reject it, but not to amend it.176
One big concern with this legislation is that if there is not enough
leeway given for population deviation among districts, legislators, or
even members of nonpartisan commissions, will cite the “one person
one vote” principle as a cause for further gerrymandering.  Essentially,
all of the other factors listed in the legislation that members of the
redistricting commissions are supposed to consider will be secondary to
ensuring that the population of each district is as equal as possible.  In
discussing his concern that the requirement for mathematical equality
for redistricting will actually enable further gerrymandering, Justice
Byron White, in his dissent in Wells v. Rockefeller stated that the
requirement:
downgrade[s] a restraint on a far greater potential threat to equal-
ity of representation, the gerrymander. Legislatures intent on
minimizing the representation of selected political or racial
groups are invited to ignore political boundaries and compact dis-
tricts so long as they adhere to population equality among districts
using standards which we know and they know are sometimes
quite incorrect. I see little merit in such a confusion of
priorities.177
Precedent suggests that the largest population deviation that a fed-
eral court will allow is a little over .8%.178  Previous deviations of only a
bit more were struck down.  For instance, a federal court rejected a
previous Kansas plan where population deviation was .94%.179
Perhaps if Congressman Cohen were to revise his bill so that it spe-
cifically allowed for additional population deviation, such as what is
allowed in other countries, those responsible for redistricting would be
able to focus on maintaining the continuity of preexisting governmen-
tal subdivisions and compactness.180  However, this is not likely to be
enough.  Because the Wesberry Court said that the “Constitution’s plain
objective [was to] mak[e] equal representation for equal numbers of
174. Id. at § 4(b)(1)(E).
175. Id. at § 4(b)(2) (A)–(C).
176. Id. at § 4(c)(2).
177. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
178. J. GERALD HEBERT ET AL., THE REALISTS’ GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING: AVOIDING
THE LEGAL PITFALLS 6 (2000).
179. State ex rel. Stephan v. Graves, 796 F. Supp. 468, 472-73 (D. Kan. 1992) (three-
judge court).
180. As previously mentioned, Britain allows for a five percent population deviation
in its districts while Canada allows a twenty-five percent deviation. See supra Part IV.  Aus-
tralia allows a plus or minus ten percent deviation, while New Zealand allows a plus or
minus five percent deviation.  Katz, supra note 165, at 253.
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people,”181 any fundamental deviations from “one person one vote”
would probably need to be in an amendment to the Constitution.  This
is an ideal—that the Constitution will be amended in a way to prevent
future partisan redistricting.  However, even though it will not address
the issues that were originally brought up by Justice White, H.R. 278 is a
step in the right direction.
Nevertheless, it does not look like this legislation will move out of
committee any time soon.  Unfortunately, in the 112th Congress, the
bill182 only garnered twenty-one cosponsors and was never reported out
of committee.183  Similarly, the bill in the 111th Congress184 only gar-
nered thirty-three cosponsors and also was not reported out of
committee.185
So while it appears as though Congress, like the Supreme Court,
will not be acting anytime soon, it will be valuable for states to continue
to pass redistricting reform measures.  Eventually, as more members of
Congress are elected from states that do not have partisan gerryman-
dering, there may be enough supporters in Congress to pass legislation
like the John Tanner Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act.
It is also possible that more people will become aware of the possibility
of reform and will call upon their representatives in Congress to enact
such legislation, or support candidates that pledge to do so.
The easiest and most feasible option is for states to pass legislation
like California’s legislation.  While states passing this type of legislation
may put pressure on Congress to do something at the national level, the
immediate effect would be that there would be more members of Con-
gress elected from non-gerrymandered districts, and thus more centrist
members willing to make bipartisan compromises.  This would help to
reduce gridlock in Congress.
CONCLUSION
Since the early days of the United States, redistricting has been
used for partisan gain.  Gerrymandering has been mastered in order to
protect incumbents from challengers and to preserve majorities in legis-
latures.  But with modern technology, gerrymandering has gotten more
precise and the problems it brings have gotten worse.
Gerrymandering causes problems for public policy.  Specifically,
gerrymandering facilitates the election of more partisan members of
Congress that do not have an electoral incentive to work with members
181. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
182. John Tanner Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act, H.R. 453, 112th
Cong. (2011).
183. H.R.453 – John Tanner Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act, CON-
GRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/legislation (search for “John Tanner Fairness and
Independence in Redistricting Act”; follow the “H.R.453” hyperlink).
184. Fairness and Independence in in Redistricting Act, H.R. 3025, 111th Cong.
(2009).
185. H.R.3025 – Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2009, CONGRESS.GOV,
http://beta.congress.gov/legislation (search for “Fairness and Independence in Redis-
tricting Act of 2009”; follow the “H.R.3025” hyperlink).
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not in their own party.  This has led to a high level of partisan gridlock
that is bad for public policy.  It is also bad for the country generally.  It
causes problems for those who participate in democracy—it negatively
impacts voter turnout, causes voters to be apathetic about voting or
even disenchants voters from wanting to participate in the system.  Ger-
rymandering can also negatively influence the behavior of elected
officials.
In the past, Congress and the Supreme Court have provided mini-
mal guidelines to the states for when they redraw district maps.  These
guidelines have been important, but they do not prevent the egregious
partisanship that takes place every decade, or in some cases, more fre-
quently.  Even though the Court has left open the possibility of there
being an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, it has not defined
what that is.  That has left states to pursue unbridled partisanship.
Many states have addressed partisan gerrymandering, and their
methods have been diverse with varying success.  But if there is to be
national progress on the issue, it will ultimately have to come from
many more states or from Congress.  There is currently not enough
support in the House of Representatives to pass legislation to mandate
that states create non-partisan redistricting commissions, and it is not
likely that there will be enough support until other states pass similar
laws.  Given the hazardous impact that stems from partisan gerryman-
dering, it is crucial for positive public policy that progress is made to
address the redistricting process.
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